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UKRAINE AND THE INTEGRATION PROJECTS IN THE EASTERN EUROPE

Summary. The article is devoted to modern integration projects on the territory of Eastern Europe, in particular to the project of "Russian World" as the most aggressive and problematic for Ukraine integration ideology. According to the author, such integration projects claim to replace the system of nation-states, that developed after the II World War and that is increasingly being criticized by competitors today. The integration project of the "Russian World", like some others, is based on religious rhetoric and considers foreign expansion as missionary, evangelistic activity. Also, Eastern Europe has other integration projects in which Russia's place is substantially lower or it is not represented at all. In these projects, Ukraine can play a significant role and unite them around itself, becoming a central subject of integration.

Keywords: Integration project, "Russian World", Russian Orthodox Church, national state.

УКРАЇНА ТА ІНТЕГРАЦІЙНІ ПРОЕКТИ У СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ

Анотація. Стаття присвячена сучасним інтеграційним проектам на території Східної Європи, зокрема проекту "Русского міру" як найбільш агресивній та актуальній для України інтеграційній ідеології. На думку автора, саме такі інтеграційні проекти претендують замінити систему національних держав, яка склалася після II Світової війни та все частіше потрапляє під критику конкурентів сьогодні. Інтеграційний проект "Русского міру", як і деякі інші, базується на релігійній риториці та розглядає зовнішню експансію як місіонерську, євангелізаторську діяльність. Також на території Східної Європи діють інші інтеграційні проекти, в яких місце Росії суттєво нижче, або вона там взагалі не представлена. Відповідно, в цих проектах Україна може відігравати значну роль та об'єднувати їх навколо себе, стаючи центральним суб'єктом інтеграції.

Ключові слова: інтеграційний проект, "Русский мір", Російська православна церква, національна держава.

The contemporary system of International Law has been established after WWII, and its main principles, for example, the principle of the territorial integrity, are connected with the times of Cold War. These principles correspond to the approach in international relations of the 1960s, when there was a rapid formation of independent states in the world, the fall of colonialism, but after the 1970s, the situation began to change when the first ideologies that were intended at implementation of integration projects of state-building appeared. 40 years ago two great secular projects in Iran and China began to change their ideology to the religious or, at least, traditionalist one, and promptly their foreign policy become expansionist, with attempts of integrating culturally approximate neighbour countries. In the late 1990s Russia has started to build its own integration project, called "Russian world", but it become an influent political and cultural challenge in the middle of 2000s, after Russia's government refused the way of European integration. The last 5 years Russian integration project poses an immediate military threat to Ukraine, and Ukrainian political circles are trying to find another opportunity of integration, because it is almost common idea, that the isolated nation-state has not perspectives in the time of globalization. The main purpose of this article is to show ideological base of Russian integration project and the perspectives of alternative projects in the Eastern Europe.

The subjects of research are ideological projects of integration of the Eastern Europe, which could become a response to the project of “Russian world”.

The system of nation-states domination has become almost unefficient after the end of the Cold War. Thomas Friedman describes that transit of the subjectivity: “Globalization has its own defining structure of power, which is much more complex than the Cold War structure. The Cold War system was built exclusively around nation-states. You acted on the world in that system through your state. The Cold War was primarily a drama of states confronting states, balancing states and aligning with states... The globalization system, by contrast, is built around three balances, which overlap and affect one another. The first is the traditional balance between nation-states... The second balance in the globalization system is between nation-states and global markets... The third balance that you have to pay attention to in the globalization system – the one that is really the newest of all – is the balance between individuals and nation-states” (Friedman, 2000: 12–13). These types of balancing indicate participation of various types of entities in the globalization, from the individuals to the global transborder community, and nation-states remain only one type of the participants in the process.

Nowadays, there are several integration projects, that are driven by the pursuance of expansion and do not pay much attention to the nation-state borders of the model of the late XX century. These projects show the model of alternative globalizations, because after their conversion to religious ideologies, based on Orthodox Christianity, Islam or traditional Confucian world-view, their relations to the national or language communities transformed toward the expansionist type with potentially global spread (Watersheds of secularization, 2017). In this case the subject of integration project looks at expansion as at kind of evangelization, and the level of mobilization of supporters become as high as in religious wars. But they usually choose as their enemy not other religion, but Western secularist world-view, and the struggle against secularism becomes a religious virtue.

The competition with the secularist West is not only in the plane of values, but also in the plane of structures. International law, borders and the subjectivity of nation-states, the exclusive right of the state to use force – these elements of the Western world order are violated by new formations of different levels, from individual terrorists and private military companies to globalization projects and military coalitions. The Western project, which formed the basis of the post-war world order, today has powerful alternatives. According to the organizers of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2019, “we are shifting from a world order based on common values to a “multiconceptual” world shaped by competing narratives seeking to create a new global architecture. We live in a world with new planetary boundaries for its development” (World Economic Forum). These projects-narratives oppose the West as geopolitical centers of gravity, and, in parallel with an alternative globalization, the military expansion of individual states and coalitions, active migration, and political populism grow.

The most aggressive and powerful integration project in the post-Soviet area is the project of “Russian world”, with Moscow as a center and attractor of integration. Moscow was a religious center in the times of Russian Empire, but that religious tradition has been interrupted in Soviet era. After proclaiming the separation of the church and the state three months after coming to power, the Soviet regime has become not just secular, but was conducting a violent secularization policy over all controlled territories. During the 1920s an alternative Soviet system of non-religious (or anti-religious) rituals began to take shape, religious organizations were deprived of property and many rights, some of them were banned and persecuted. Thus, in 1930s the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was abolished, in 1946 – the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. However, even despite the persecution of the religious

communities, the Ukrainian SSR remained the most religious in the Soviet Union, with about 8,000 religious communities registered in 1990, while in Russia there were less than 4,000 communities. On January 1, 1992 there were already 13217 religious communities in Ukraine, while in Russia the number of religious communities reached such a level only in 1997. Therefore, even in spite of the domination of Orthodoxy in the religious area, during the first years of the independent Russia, the Orthodox integration project for the post-Soviet space was not dominant in the Russian Federation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union there were two ways of understanding the future of the Russian Federation among the Russian political elites. The first option was to integrate Russia into a Western project with the further entry into pan-European structures. So, in 1994, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU was signed. As Russia's political expert A. Sytin notes, at that time Europe saw in Russia an important partner, whose integration into the pan-European space will help to admire other countries in the region easier. For its part, the Russian regime tried to enter into cooperation with the EU and to remain a regional leader. But after the change of authorities, relations between the Russian Federation and the EU have worsened and after 2002 the European integration agenda has been cancelled (Sytin, 2017). The understanding of the values and guidelines of Russia's development was transformed.

Followers of the second variant of the development were not ready to abandon the central place of Russia in the new integration project. Initially, this option was discussed in the intellectual circles, but after the arrival of V. Putin's administration and the refusal of the European integration of Russia the cultural, ideological and military expansion of Russia began to take place on the basis of the integration project of the "Russian world". As the Ukrainian researcher V. Hurzhy writes, "Things have changed since the mid-2000s, when "Russian world" gradually moved from intellectual circles to the Kremlin government offices and the Russian Orthodox Church, becoming one of the main vectors of the Russian foreign policy. This is particularly due to a high attractiveness and high mobilization potential of the concept" (Hurzhy, 2015: 94). And if at first a greater emphasis was placed on language unity, religious rhetoric gradually became more important, because religious rhetoric has a much larger mobilization potential and may offer an alternative to secular Western value system.

Protection and popularization of the Russian language, especially in the diaspora, became the task of the fund "Russian world", created in 2007. Following the example of Western institutions like the Goethe-Institut, the Cervantes Institute, the British Council and even the Chinese Confucius Institute, established several years earlier, the Russian government created a network of Russian centers (by the end of 2017 there were 110 in the world) and Cabinets of the Russian world (144 by the end of 2017). These organizations work as language courses, hold conferences and other events devoted to Russian language and literature, as well as to Russian culture in general. The largest annual event of the fund, the Assembly of the Russian World, also gradually moved from discussing language issues to alternative values, based on religious traditions. As the Head of the fund V. Nikonov stated at the Assembly in 2017: "Ideas, that our global community can offer, lie on the surface: they are fixed in our national code. These are the common human values that are contained in the sacred writings – in their true, but not perverted sense. These are the ideas of true freedom and faith, true peace and justice, true life and human dignity, true sovereignty and independence of the state" (Report, 2017). In many aspects, these topics are similar to the Western worldview, but everywhere there is a "real", that automatically opposes them to "perverted" Western visions, which are not contained in the sacred writings. So, we can see the reference to religious values that are misinterpreted in other paradigms.

And meanwhile, the Assembly in 2017 was held under the general slogan “Ideas of the Russian world for the world”. I.e., an alternative value system based on religious orders is offered to the entire global world, not just to the Russian-speaking diaspora. At this stage, we can already state ambitions of global dominance, which it would be difficult to have based solely on language identity.

The participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the formation of the “Russian world” project began before the election of the Metropolitan Cyril (Gundyaev) as Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Belarussian researcher S. Aleinikova claims that since the collapse of the USSR, the work of the Russian Orthodox Church in the framework of integration processes was focused on the creation of a “Slavic triangle” of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (Aleinikova, 2017: 79–80). However, the final design and presentation of the “Russian world” program took place soon after the election of Cyril to the Patriarch, at the opening of the Third Assembly of the Russian world in November 2009. Patriarch Cyril not only became the church speaker of the “Russian world” project, but in fact created a new understanding of this project by his speeches, transforming it into a confessional one. Such a transformation had both its pros and cons. On the one hand, the denominational factor really allowed to appeal to a wider audience, because apart from Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church also has an influence in other states where the Russian-speaking diaspora does not have a clear Russian identity. Already in his speech in 2009, Patriarch included not only Ukraine and Belarus but also Moldova to the “Russian world” area (Speech, 2009). And at the end of the speech it has been separately emphasized, that the Russian language should not become the only one for other peoples of the “Russian world”, they must develop their own indigenous languages, which only enrich the common one. Already next year, speaking at the IV Assembly of the Russian world, Patriarch Cyril has added to this civilization area also Kazakhstan. His speech was already more integrally oriented (Speech, 2010). It is important that in 2010 Moldova was called “Moldavia” instead of “Moldova” and Belarus – “Belorussia” instead of “Belarus”, which is feature of imperial discourse and speaks more about the territory of the empire, than about independent modern states. Thus, gradually the agenda of the integration of the Russian-speaking diaspora turned into an imperial Orthodox integration project.

Until the beginning of the military conflict with Russia, the ideology of the “Russian world” was not systematically researched in Ukraine, whereas after 2014, many scholars began to conceptualize this doctrine and its relations to Ukraine. For example, such authors as A. Kolodny, L. Fylypovych, S. Shkil, V. Hurzhy, who devoted their researches to the theme of “Russian world” as a religious ideology. In the period from 2014 to 2019, several complex studies have been published by the National Institute for Strategic Studies, in particular, “Ukraine and the project of the Russian world” (2014), “Information challenges of the hybrid warfare: content, channels, mechanisms of counteraction” (2016), “Putin’s regime: Reload – 2018” (late 2018). In these studies important attention is paid to the religious foundations of the integration project “Russian world”, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in its development and promotion abroad.

Similarly, alternative variants of integration projects were not made. It was typical to oppose the European integration and pro-Russian vector, especially since the late 2013 (during the last months of V. Yanukovych’s regime), and this opposition has become the political mainstream at the time of P. Poroshenko. The culmination of this opposition in the political dimension are the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2019, when the idea of integration into the EU and NATO was enshrined in the main law. But the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration has its own negative features. Firstly, in the European Union there are internal isolationist movements developing, including Brexit, the referendum in Catalonia in 2017, and the actual emergence of a block of Eastern European countries within the EU. EU–US relations during the presidency of D. Trump also became more complicated, and this change became a factor of instability. Secondly, the inclusion into such a large-scale integration project, as the Euro-Atlantic, places Ukraine on the

periphery's role in making decisions within this unity. Protection of the interests of Ukraine takes place only in the context of the interests of the all project, and therefore we should take into account the wishes of stronger members, even when it may endanger the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our state.

There are also several other integration projects, that are marginal in Ukraine today, but have a potential for growing in the future. One of them is the Chinese project, called "One Belt, One Road", created in 2013. The main purpose of this project is to develop the global infrastructure network, concentrated around China. In the framework of this project the lesser one exists – "16+1", that unies 16 Central-Eastern European countries from Bulgaria and Albania to Estonia, but without Ukraine. Today the Ukrainian participation in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative is minimal, despite the great economical potential of Chinese project. The second alternative integration project is Intermarium, that may integrate states of Eastern Europe between Baltic, Adriatic and Azov seas. This project does not have such a powerful potential as Chinese one, but the role of Ukraine in it could be much more important. The advantage of Intermarium integration project is in cultural and religious approximity of its participants – all of them have common Christian identity and history, although they had conflicts in history, that could become a challenge for future integration.

Conclusions. The time of globalization requires not only internal stability from the states, but at the same time the participation in regional and global integration projects. In the XXI-st century there are several alternative globalization projects like Euro-Atlantic, Chinese and so on, that do not limited by the state borders and try to expand their political and cultural influence abroad. The Russia's "Russian world" project is the most aggressive and powerful integration project on the post-Soviet area. It has appeared in the late 1990-s as the project of integrating the Russian-speaking diaspora, but it transformed into religious ideology till the 2010. Today the pro-Orthodox ideology of "Russian world" tries to make influence on the countries of Eastern Europe like Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova. In this situation Ukraine should find another integration project, or make its own one, with the fundamental condition, that the interests of Ukraine will be taken into account in decision-making process. There could be as well global integration projects like Euro-Atlantic or Chinese, as regional projects like Intermarium.

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