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## **SEMANTIC PECULIARITIES OF ETHICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE**

Ethics as a branch of philosophy, can be described as philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems, moral rules. It operates its own terminology, which has its own semantic and functional peculiarities. We can distinguish there 2 subgroups according to their functioning in ethical issue: proper ethical terminology which we observe only in theoretical works of moralists and so-called "moral language" terms of which could be easily found in everyday language and in ethical terminology get specialized meaning of "moral terms". As to speak about proper ethical terms they possess only one narrow semantic meaning which is deeply connected with the theoretical basis of philosophical studies. They are such terms as "utilitarianism", "deontic", "aretaic", "obsurantism" and so on e.g. "deontic judgement" - that is a judgement obtaining moral obligation.

"Moral Language" presents much more interest for linguistics. Here we deal with ethical terms with a broad meaning which need more attention to their semantic value. Any definition which seeks to identify the meaning of ethical terms with that of scientific ones and which does so without further explanation or qualification, is extremely likely to be misleading. It will suggest that the questions of normative ethics like those of science, give rise to an agreement or disagreement that is exclusively in belief.

In this way, ignoring disagreement in attitude it will lead to only a half of a picture, at best, of the situations in which ethical terms are actually used. There are many cases in which the ethical terms are used in the way that is not exclusively scientific, and we must recognize a meaning which suits to their additional function, that is extrascientific one. They have a quasi-imperative function which must be explained with careful attention to emotive meaning; and they have acquiring a particularly detailed study of linguistic flexibility. Ethical terms are noted for their ambiguity. It is essential to realize that everyday life presents us not with "a" usage of ethical terms but with many different usages. Some definite number of senses for ethical terms has been sharply if tacitly distinguished in ordinary usage. But ethical terms are more than ambiguous, they are vague. The vagueness of ethical terms is of the same sort, but extreme; the undecided referents are more numerous and diverse. An ethical term may accordingly be adapted to broad range of uses, sometimes for purposes and sometimes not.

We must be sensitive, then, to the fact that ethical terms are not predestined to abide by any one set of rules, and that analysis cannot “discover” the “real” sense. Yet vagueness is not to be dealt with capriciously. “If analysis cannot disclose “the” sense, its sample definitions must be guided by the broad purposes for which any ethical term is commonly used. Otherwise it will increase the extent of vagueness and ambiguity, instead of rendering it better understood” [2, 87].

The peculiar moral attitudes, associated with the moral sense of ethical terms, are not easily described. The emotive meaning may serve to evoke the favour of the hearer, it does not become a peculiar moral term. So, there is some difference in semantics of the term “good” in these 2 sentences:

- *He is a good fellow.*

- *He is (morally) good fellow.*

From the context that are most typical of normative ethics, the ethical terms have a function that is both emotive and descriptive. The descriptive function requires attentive consideration. If we are to treat it adequately, bidding linguistic flexibility we can't hope to end the matter by giving one simple definition. We must examine many “samples” of the way in which the ethical terms can be used, when occasion requires. The “one-and-only-one-true-meaning superstition”, is unacceptable here. So, describing ethical terms, we should mind the correlation between descriptive and emotive meaning. Emotive meaning is a meaning in which the response (from the hearer's point of view) or the stimulus (from the speaker's point of view) is a range of emotion. A sign's descriptive meaning is its disposition to produce cognitive mental processes, where “cognitive” is to be taken as a general term designating such specific kinds of mental activity as believing, thinking. Emotive and descriptive meanings, both in origin and practical operation, stand in extremely close relationship. Such a compromise must often be made in the analysis of ethical terms. Since the emotive meaning of a term is of dispositional nature, its psychological effects will vary with the attendant circumstances. The effect of ethical terms in directing attitudes, though not wholly dissimilar to that of imperatives, must be explained with reference to a characteristic and subtle kind of emotive meaning. In virtue of this kind of meaning, ethical judgements alter attitudes, not by an appeal to self-conscious efforts (as in the case with imperatives), but by the more flexible mechanism of suggestion - ethical terms lead people, rather than command them. Ethical terms are sometimes used hypostatically, in this case we should search for descriptive meaning in the very context.

We can also distinguish semi-ethical terms - terms which are not usually given unqualified ethical status of “good”, “right”, “duty” but which introduce many of the same considerations, so as “culture”.

The terms “moral” and “ethical” are often used as equivalents to “right” or “good” and are opposed to “immoral” and “unethical”. But we also speak of moral experiences, moral judgements, moral codes, moral arguments, moral consciousness, moral deliberation, moral reasoning, moral principle, moral advice, moral thinking or the moral point of view. “Ethical” is used in this way, too. So we can speak of ethical agreement, ethical question, ethical methodology, ethical judgements, ethical issue, ethical context, ethical sentence.

Here “ethical” and “moral” do not mean “morality right” or “morally good”. They mean “pretending to morality” and are opposed to “immorality” or “nonethical”. Similarly, the term “morality” is sometimes used as opposed to “immorality”, as when we say that the essence of morality is love to speak of the morality of an action. But we also use the word “morality” to refer to something that is coordinate with but different from art, science, law, convention or religion, though it may be related to them. The term “moral” is usually used to evaluate or to allocate. When we say, for instance that a reason is moral reason, we may be evaluating it as morally good or right reason for doing something; just as if we call a remark immoral, we may be taken to mean that it is wicked or vicious. On the other hand, when we say that a reason or remark is moral we may be allocating it as a move within the moral universe of discourse. “Nonmoral” or “amoral” is the customary opposite of “moral” in this sense.

“When I make choice, I am implicitly choosing between human good and human evil and so between moral good and moral evil. For, to be human is to be a moral being” [3, 5].

The most important place in ethical terminology is occupied by such terms as “good” and “right”. Certain theorists are accustomed to make a sharp distinction between “good” and “right”. We can find a little ground for such a distinction. There are slight emotive differences, and different ranges of ambiguity for the more specific senses; but that is true of any pair of ethical terms. The only point is the term “right” is much less suited than “good” for judging persons or things; it is usually reserved for judging people’s actions; e.g.

*“That is a good actions”.*

*“His philanthropic action is right”.*

So, some ethical terms are specialized for judging actions; they are: “duty”, “obligation”, “ought”. They occur in judgements that are overtly about actions, e.g.

*“it is (morally) right for him to be exceptionally charitable, but not his duty or obligation - nothing that he positively ought to do”.*

“Right” has a less coercive effect. It praises for commission, whereas “duty” and “obligation” are usually limited to moral context.

As for nonmoral uses, the ethical terms “right”, “good”, “ought” are sometimes the equivalent of “correct”, “effective”, “usually approved”. It is only an emotive meaning that makes “right” influence actions more specifically and directly, e.g.

*He is a good man —> His actions are right* (The same meaning is preserved)

We do also speak of “good actions” or “deeds”, but here “good” is not properly used as synonym to “right”; it seems to mean either that action has a good motive or that it has good consequences. Probably, the distinction between what “good” means and what it suggests is the distinction between descriptive disposition of term. Very often the term does no more than indicates agreement in attitude, serving only to prepare the way for relevant discussion. , At other times its effect may be strongly hortatory. There are even times when its usual emotive effect may be reversed,, as when it is used in irony, or when it is accompanied by the tone of voice that suggests “goody-goody”. There are times when “good” has much the same use as “effective” as in: “Wearing oilskins is a good mean of keeping dry at storm”, though the issue in this case has nothing to do with morality.

Sometimes the term “good” has the same use as “almost universally approved” or “approved by members of our community”. Here the reference to attitudes is in effect descriptive rather than emotive.

But the term “good” is very flexible. It may be used to mean such qualities as reliable, charitable, honest and so on. On the other hand the term may be denied all this variety of descriptive reference and thinned out to refer only to the attitudes of the speaker. In any case, the use of the term “good” presupposes approving from the speaker’s point of view.

Ethical terms are used in ethical judgements. Moral judgements are concerned with recommending something for approval or disapproval; and this involves more than a disinterested description or a cold debate. Moralists’ judgements plead and advise, open the way to counter advice. e.g. X is morally evil-approving or disapproving. “In this way moral judgements go beyond cognition, speaking to the cognitive-affective nature of men” [3, 26].

In some moral judgements we say that a certain action or kind of action is morally right, wrong, obligatory, a duty or ought or not ought to be done. In others we talk not about action or kinds of actions but about persons, motives, intentions, traits of really good, bad, virtuous, vicious, responsible, blameworthy, saintly, despicable and so on. E.g. One should be responsible for what he did. Benevolence is a virtue.

So, in the ethical judgements ethical terms are used in their moral senses. There are also judgements of nonmoral value. In them we evaluate different sorts of things: cars, painting, experiences, we say they are good, bad, desirable but we do not mean they are morally good or morally bad, since they are things which can not be morally good or bad. E.g. All men have right to freedom.

Ethical statements have a meaning that is approximately, and in part, imperative. This imperative meaning explains why ethical judgements are so intimately related to agreement and disagreement in attitude, and helps to indicate how normative ethics can be distinguished from

psychology or the natural sciences. Every ethical judgement presupposes some moral aim. This fact can differ ethical judgements from pure scientific.

Ethical judgements have a function in influencing, guiding, remolding attitudes either of speaker or of listener. Ethical judgements, though influenced, exert on influence. So, if a specification of any existent set of senses were included in the definition of an ethical term, that might too easily emphasize their effect on the judgements, neglecting that of the judgements on them. Any speaker will at other times be a hearer, and if those who address ethical judgements to him are indicating their several attitudes, with attendant emotive effects, and with supporting reasons, he will be subject to their cumulative influence. "Even when a man makes a specific judgement about X ("X is good"), his influence on the hearer's attitudes will usually extend more widely, over some class of objects into which X falls; for the hearer line the speaker, will instinctively avail himself of the psychological economy that comes from ordering the objects of his attitudes in some rough sort of classification

[2,95].

And only moral judgement is concerned with the relation of the action to the principle of all human acts. That is one of the most important differentiating point of ethical judgement from scientific ones.

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## GESCHICHTE UND ANTHROPONYMIE DER DEUTSCHEN ANSIEDLUNG BECKERSDORF (Ein Beitrag zur galiziendeutschen Familienforschung)

**I. Einheitliche Überlegungen.** - Dieser Aufsatz setzt sich zum Ziel, die deutschen Familiennamen des Dorfes Beckersdorf/Ostgalizien (heute das Territorium der Ukraine) im Zusammenhang mit dem deutschen Ansiedlungsprozeß der Gemeinde einer Analyse zu unterziehen. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, daß die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse samt dem vorgelegten empirischen Material neben der Onomastik auch aus der Sicht der Siedlungsgeschichte, der Sprachgeographie und der Dialektgeographie wie auch der Ortsnamenforschung nicht ohne Relevanz sein dürften.

**II. Der Ansiedlungsprozeß der Deutschen anhand der Familiennamen.** - Das Dorf *Beckersdorf (Falkenstein)*, ukr. *Bekersdorf*, auch *Bekeri-w*, *Beneriw*, poln. *Beckersdorf*, auch *Bekersdorf*, *Bekerów* befand sich gegenüber dem Dorf Nowosiolka (ukr. Nowosilka) auf dem rechten Ufer des Flusses Koropez, eine österreichische Meile (~7,6 km) nordöstlich von der Bezirksstadt Podhajce (ukr. Pidhajci) [9, 125].

Die Gründung dieser deutschen Ansiedlung datiert vom Sommer 1784 [4, 19; 6, 39; 6, 379; 8, 148]. Nach anderen Angaben fand die Gründung von Beckersdorf in den Jahren 1782-1784 statt [4, 19]. Zunächst hieß die Niederlassung Falkenstein. Unter diesem Namen existierte das Dorf bis 1787, als es in Beckersdorf umbenannt wurde [7, 67]. 1936 wurde der Name unter Druck der polnischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Beckerów geändert [3, 3]. Als Folge des deutsch-sowjetischen Vertrages von 1939, in dem Polen aufgeteilt wurde [5, 1174], wanderten alle Deutschen im Januar 1940 [6, 39] nach Deutschland aus. Nach Angaben der Deutschen Volkszählung von 1940 lebten in Beckersdorf 360 Einwohner, darunter 143 Ukrainer, 169 Polen, 47 Lemken (Ethnographische Gruppe der Ukrainer in den Karpaten) und 1 Deutscher [6, 44f.]. In der Nachschlagewerke der Ukrainischen SSR aus der Nachkriegszeit wird die ehemalige deutsche Ansiedlung als das Chutir (Gehöft) Beneriw erwähnt, das mit dem Dorf Nowosilka (Bezirk Pidhajci, verbunden ist [10, 576]. Danach fehlt jegliche schriftliche Erwähnung von Beckersdorf verloren. Es bleibt nur in den Erinnerungen der Menschen im Lande und mehr noch bei denen in der Emigration,