

UDC 94(4) „1919–1923

DOI <https://doi.org/10.32782/2307-7778/2025.1.22>**Andrii SHCHEHLOV**

*candidate of historical sciences, doctoral student of the
Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy
Heroiv Maidanu, 32, Lviv, Ukraine, 79026 (deepinfaith2202@gmail.com)*

Андрій ЩЕГЛОВ

*кандидат історичних наук, докторант
Національної академії сухопутних військ імені гетьмана Петра Сагайдачного,
вул. Героїв Майдану, 32, Львів, Україна, 79026 (deepinfaith2202@gmail.com)*

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6484-0864>

**«...SOONER OR LATER, GALICIA WILL HAVE TO BE SOVIETIZED...»:
STRATEGIC PLANS AND INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AGAINST
THE POLISH STATE IN THE TERRITORY OF EASTERN GALICIA (1919–1923)**

Abstract. *The aim of the article is to analyze the strategic plans and tactics for implementing Soviet expansionism against the Polish state through intelligence, subversive, and propaganda activities in the territory of Eastern Galicia in 1919–1923. In accordance with this objective, the study summarizes the conceptual foundations of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine regarding Eastern Galicia – considered one of the footholds for the future “march on Europe” and “world revolution” – as reflected in modern Ukrainian historiography. The article incorporates previously unpublished documents from the quasi-state entity, the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic, preserved in the collections of the State Archives of the Ternopil Region. Particular attention is paid to Soviet propaganda narratives directed against both the Polish state and the Ukrainian People’s Republic during the period of national liberation struggles in the early 1920s.*

The study reveals the main directions of subversive activities carried out by both the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia and special sabotage groups and intelligence structures of the USSR operating along the “Zbruch border” and in adjacent territories. The article also presents the response measures taken by the Polish state’s security forces against attempts to destabilize the socio-political situation in Eastern Galicia on the eve of and following the formal international legal recognition of its inclusion into Poland on the basis of autonomy in 1923.

The methodological foundation of the article includes historical, systemic, and functional principles of scholarly inquiry, applied through a comprehensive combination of general scientific, interdisciplinary, and specialized historical research methods to address a complex scholarly problem.

Scientific novelty: *For the first time, based on a synthesis of contemporary Ukrainian historiography and the use of previously unpublished archival materials, the article reveals the preconditions and evolution of the implementation of the Soviet expansionist foreign policy course against the newly established Polish Republic in the region of Eastern Galicia through the comprehensive use of intelligence, subversive, and propaganda means.*

Main results. *While recognizing the significant contributions of modern Ukrainian scholars studying the western Ukrainian lands during the national liberation struggles and the establishment of control over Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia by the reconstituted Polish state, the article emphasizes the lack of a comprehensive assessment of the destructive influence of Soviet Russia’s special services and party structures – as well as those of its de facto satellite, the Ukrainian SSR – specifically on the Eastern Galician territories. These were viewed as an important platform for implementing the expansionist foreign policy of the Bolshevik leadership after the end of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919 and during the “liberation campaign against Poland” in 1920.*

Undoubtedly, local communist organizations, which later united into the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (renamed in 1925 as the Communist Party of Western Ukraine), played an important role in this policy. However, the main instruments of both aggressive communist propaganda and active intelligence and

provocative sabotage were the relevant Soviet special services and their agents. Despite significant financial investment and the involvement of a segment of the local population under the direction of Soviet supervisors, these efforts failed to achieve the strategic goals set by the Kremlin leadership. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that these actions led to a noticeable disorganization of the region's socio-political life, in which the Second Polish Republic sought to assert its authority through repressive and punitive measures. This in no way allows for the assertion that Soviet intelligence, subversive, and propaganda activities in Eastern Galicia in 1919–1923 were in the interests of the majority Ukrainian population of the newly created Lviv, Stanislaviv, and Ternopil voivodeships of the Polish state.

Key words: Eastern Galicia, Poland, Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Russia, intelligence, propaganda, sabotage.

**«...РАНО ЧИ ПІЗНО ГАЛИЧИНУ ДОВЕДЕТЬСЯ РАДЯНІЗУВАТИ...»:
СТРАТЕГІЧНІ ПЛАНИ ТА ІНСТРУМЕНТАРІЙ РАДЯНСЬКОГО ЕКСПАНСІОНІЗМУ
ПРОТИ ПОЛЬСЬКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ НА ТЕРИТОРІЇ СХІДНОЇ ГАЛИЧИНИ (1919–1923 РР.)**

Анотація. Мета статті – проаналізувати стратегічні плани й тактику реалізації радянського експансіонізму проти Польської держави засобами розвідувальної, підривної та пропагандистської діяльності на території Східної Галичини в 1919–1923 рр. Відповідно до поставленої мети в роботі проведено узагальнення сучасною вітчизняною історіографією концептуальних засад зовнішньої політики Радянської Росії та Радянської України щодо Східної Галичини як одного із плацдармів майбутнього «походу в Європу» та «світової революції» з долученням раніше неопублікованих документів їхнього квазідержавного утворення – Галицької Соціалістичної Радянської Республіки з фондів Державного архіву Тернопільської області. Окремо досліджуються радянські пропагандистські нарративи, спрямовані проти як Польської держави, так Української Народної Республіки періоду національно-визвольних змагань початку 20-х років ХХ ст. Розкриваються засади й основні напрями підривної діяльності як Комуністичної партії Східної Галичини, так і спеціальних диверсійних груп та розвідувальних структур СРСР на лінії «Збручанського кордону» й суміжних територіях. Окремо представлені заходи реагування силових структур Польської держави на спроби дезорганізації суспільно-політичного становища в Східній Галичині напередодні та після формального міжнародно-правового визнання включення її до складу цієї держави на засадах автономії в 1923 р.

Методологічною основою статті є історичний, системний та функціональний принципи наукового пізнання через комплексне поєднання загальнонаукових, міждисциплінарних та спеціальних історичних методів дослідження для розкриття складної наукової проблематики.

Наукова новизна: вперше на основі узагальнення сучасної вітчизняної історіографії із залученням раніше неопублікованих архівних матеріалів розкрито передумов та еволюцію реалізації радянського експансіоністського зовнішнього курсу проти новопосталої Польської республіки на теренах Східної Галичини через комплексне використання засобів розвідувальної, підривної та пропагандистської діяльності.

Основні результати. Відзначаючи вагомий напрацювання сучасних вітчизняних дослідників із західноукраїнських земель періоду українських національно-визвольних змагань та встановленням контролю над Східною Галичиною й Західною Волиню відновленої Польської держави варто вказати на відсутність комплексної оцінки деструктивного впливу спеціальних служб і партійних структур Радянської Росії та її фактичного сателіта в особі Української СРР саме на східногалицькі терени як вагомий плацдарм для реалізації експансіоністської зовнішньої політики більшовицького керівництва після після завершення польсько-української війни 1918–1919 р. в процесі «визвольного походу на Польщу» 1920 р. Безумовно, важливе місце в реалізації радянського експансіоністського зовнішньополітичного курсу надавалося місцевим комуністичним організаціям, які згодом об'єдналися в Комуністичну партію Східної Галичини, що 1925 р. тримала нову назву – Комуністична партія Західної України. Проте головним інструментом не тільки агресивної комуністичної пропаганди, а й активної розвідки й провокативних диверсій були відповідні радянські спецслужби та їхні агенти. Проте, попри вкладення в різні заходи значних коштів та залучення певної частини місцевого населення під керівництвом радянських кураторів, їхніми зусиллями не вдалося досягнути стратегічних цілей кремлівського керівництва. Однак не можна замовчувати того, щоб під таким впливом спостерігалася помітна

дезорганізація суспільно-політичного життя краю, де свою владу репресивно-каральними заходами прагнула утвердити Друга Річ Посполита. Це жодним чином не дає змоги твердити, що радянська розвідувальна підривна та пропагандистська діяльність на території Східної Галичини в 1919–1923 рр. була в інтересах переважного українського населення новостворених Львівського, Станіславівського й Тернопільського воєводств Польської держави.

Ключові слова: Східна Галичина, Польща, Радянська Україна, Радянська Росія, розвідка, пропаганда, диверсії.

Introduction. The issue of the formation and implementation of expansionist foreign policy through the use of propaganda, intelligence, and sabotage tools by the Soviet Union's special services to destabilize the internal situation in Eastern Galicia following the end of the First World War and the emergence of new states is not only a theoretical problem requiring a historiographical synthesis with the inclusion of newly discovered archival materials. It also holds applied significance for analyzing the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as well as its use of hybrid methods of destructive informational and psychological influence against Poland within the context of President Vladimir Putin's revanchist foreign policy course in the first quarter of the 21st century.

In the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, historical scholarship must not only summarize and systematize relevant studies, but also respond adequately to the challenges of an ideologically charged past, exposing the narratives of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian historiography.

Ukrainian scholars define expansionism as «the implementation of a state's foreign policy aimed at extending and strengthening its dominance over other states and regions», emphasizing that, in essence, it constitutes «a state's policy of conquest toward other countries, regions, territories, markets, sources of raw materials, and economies» [1, p. 102]. At the same time, political scientist A. Holtsov notes that expansionism is characteristic not only of the foreign policy of great powers, but also of medium and even small states (including self-proclaimed ones). Depending on the substance of a state's expansionist geostrategy, various forms can be distinguished, such as political, military, and ideological expansion [2, p. 64]. As V. Holovchenko aptly observes, the international and historical roots of Russia's aggressive foreign policy behavior have long remained outside the scope of domestic research [3, p. 68–69].

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the achievements of contemporary historiography in uncovering specific aspects of Soviet intelligence, subversive, and propaganda activities against the restored Polish Republic in the works of T. Halytska-Didukh [4], S. Humennyi [5–7], R. Kotsan [8–10], M. Lytvyn [11–13], O. Malets [14–15], R. Podkur [16], O. Razyhraiev [17], I. Soliar [18]. However, to date, there is no comprehensive study of the plans and tactics employed to establish Soviet influence in the territory of Eastern Galicia that incorporates newly discovered archival documents.

Main Body of the Article. After the defeat of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in Eastern Galicia, tendencies toward centralization and unitary governance strengthened, accompanied by the restriction of local self-government [19, p. 161]. In such conditions, Polish political circles, primarily guided by their own interests, disregarded the aspirations of the Ukrainian population for independence. In our opinion, this situation could not go unexploited by representatives of the extreme left forces, who were aligned with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia, which militarily controlled it.

In 1919, with the aim of coordinating efforts to spread communist ideology globally, the Communist International was founded under Moscow's leadership [1, p. 131]. Its purpose was to ensure the course toward world revolution and to promote the creation of a global communist state.

Against the backdrop of the split in the Second International and amid the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919, the first communist cells began to form in the western Ukrainian lands, although they

did not enjoy widespread support among the local population. By early 1919, eight underground communist organizations were active in Eastern Galicia, with more than 180 members. During the first regional party conference, held in February 1919 in Stanislav, these disparate cells were unified into a single structure – the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (CPEG). The conference delegates formed the Central Committee of the party, which was led by K. Savrych (Maximovych) [14, p. 34].

The fact of inertia and the expectation of the “importation” of revolution from outside was later confirmed by the leaders of The Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (CPEG). It is worth noting that in the following year, 1920, soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies were formed exclusively in cities where the Soviet Russian army was stationed, which will be discussed in more detail later [20, p. 41].

The lack of a unified political program concerning the national and organizational issues led to a split within the ranks of the CPEG and exacerbated relations with the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (CWPP). The resolution of these contradictions was the focus of the First Congress of the CPEG, which began on October 30, 1921. However, on the opening day, all delegates were arrested and imprisoned in the building of the Saint George Cathedral in Lviv (the residence of the head of the Greek Catholic Church – note by A. Shcheglov) [21, p. 52].

The foreign policy of Russia at that time was based on the desire to spread the Bolshevik revolution to Central and Western Europe. In this context, Moscow viewed Eastern Galicia as a strategic foothold, a kind of “gateway” for exporting the revolution to Poland, Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary through a victorious offensive military action [12, p. 293; 22, p. 14].

As indicated in a letter from the leader of the Bolsheviks, V. Lenin, to the Polish communists (translated and quoted by O. Kozoriz – note by A. Shcheglov): «The victory of Soviet power from within in Poland is a tremendous international victory. If now, in my opinion, Soviet power has achieved an international victory of 20-30%, then after the victory of Soviet power from within in Poland, the international victory of the communist revolution will be 40–50%, maybe even 51%. Because Poland, alongside Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will undermine the entire system built on the Versailles peace» [23, p. 152–153].

In the context of the described plans for a «world revolution», Soviet Russia attempted to push its intervention to the West by bayonets, primarily aiming in 1920 to «reclaim» Poland and destroy its alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) [24, p. 173]. The Bolshevik campaign in Poland sparked a new surge of the world revolution, which by that time had already somewhat lost its intensity. Poland became the first platform for the practical «export» of the revolution beyond Russia [15, p. 111–112].

In particular, personnel from the Soviet state security organs of Soviet Ukraine were directly involved from the very beginning in intelligence and sabotage activities aimed against Poland. For example, in April 1920, special reconnaissance groups, disguised in civilian clothes, crossed the border of this state, not only to gather information but also to incite underground resistance on the territory of Poland at the time [25, p. 308].

This primarily stemmed from the fact that Eastern Galicia held an important place in the Bolsheviks’ strategic plans as a key foothold for spreading the revolution to the West. Moreover, the events of 1918–1919, when the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) existed, were still fresh in the memory of the local population. Its émigré government, along with President Y. Petrushevych, continued to operate in Vienna. In response to this, according to the plans of V. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership, it was necessary to create an alternative Soviet state formation, supposedly formed by the will of the working people. On Lenin’s instructions, in April 1920, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPSU) decided to establish a «Galician government». The leadership of the Galician Revolutionary Committee (Galrevkom) was entrusted to V. Zatonsky, whose

candidacy was approved by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) in Moscow on July 16. At this same plenary session, held under Lenin's direct supervision, it was decided that Galicia should be proclaimed an «independent Soviet republic» [26, p. 281].

This is how, later on, the leader of the Galrevkom, V. Zatonsky, defined the preconditions for the uprising of the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic in his programmatic article "What is truly Soviet Power?": «Soviet power in Galicia did not arise by itself through the grace of the revolution. It was not like in Russia, where the broad masses... powerfully rose up and began to create new forms of life. Soviet power came to Galicia with the Red Army... It was awaited like a blessing, as someone else's grace... From now on, the working people of Galicia are truly free, not only on paper or by law, because there is no power over them, neither that of the feudal lords nor the usurious bourgeoisie. As for the educated people, all those petty clerics, the so-called doctors, lawyers, those who had supported Petliura, Petrushevych, or the Polish nobility, who had been involved in politics and caused harm, let them leave from Red Galicia» [27, p. 4.].

Returning to the military-political situation, after the breakthrough of the Polish-Ukrainian front on June 5, 1920, favorable conditions were created for the occupation of Western Volhynia and Galicia by the Soviet 1st Cavalry Army under the command of S. Budyonny, as well as for further advancement into the depths of Poland and Central-Eastern Europe. Already on July 18, 1920, units of the Red Army crossed the Zbruch River and entered the territory of Galicia, and on July 26, they captured Ternopil, which became the capital of the proclaimed Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (GSSR). The formation of its government – the Galician Revolutionary Committee (Galrevkom) and its organizational base – began in July 1920 in the town of Zhmerynka [28, p. 118]. Its creation and functioning took place without taking into account the wishes of the population of Eastern Galicia [29, p. 76]. However, to conceal their true intentions, mass events were staged to show the support of the local population. For example, on August 8, 1920, at a rally attended by 1,500 people, a resolution was adopted which stated: "...we greet with great enthusiasm the liberating Red Army, which has freed us from the heavy yoke of the Polish lords and from the plundering bands of the traitor to the working people, Petliura... We send our sincere greetings and thanks and ask you to continue leading the proletarian liberating Red Army, and in its ranks, us, to the final victory, which will come soon. Long live the glorious victorious Red Army of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Galician Republics. Long live the leaders of the Revolution, comrade V. Lenin and comrade Trotsky!" [30, p. 1].

The first legislative act of the Galrevkom was the declaration «To the Working People of the World, to the Governments of Socialist Soviet Republics, and to the Governments of All Capitalist States» dated July 15, 1920. In this declaration, the Galrevkom solemnly asserted the formal right of the people to self-determination and proclaimed the full state independence of Eastern Galicia. It declared that after the region's liberation from Polish rule, a workers' and peasants' state – the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic – would be formed. The Galrevkom called on the governments of all countries to establish diplomatic relations with this new republic and expressed full support for the internal and foreign policies of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The declaration also proclaimed the abolition of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and outlined the basic principles of economic policy and state building for the Galician SSR [29, p. 64].

Soviet policy towards the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) was based on double standards, reflecting the contradiction between official rhetoric and real actions. Formally, for the international community, the Soviet government sought to create the impression that the USSR was an independent republic with some autonomy in decision-making. However, in actual political practice, Moscow's strategy was one of incorporation [31, p. 20].

At the meeting on August 1, 1920, the Galrevkom adopted Decree No. 1, which proclaimed the establishment of Soviet Socialist Power in Galicia. The decree stated:

«1) All organs of political, judicial, and public authority of the so-called Polish state are abolished.

4) Instead of the legislative acts, treaties, and orders of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, the so-called Polish state, and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), the laws, resolutions, and decrees of the Galician Revolutionary Committee shall be followed. In cases where such are temporarily absent, revolutionary conscience of the working class and poorer peasantry shall be the guiding principle» [8, p. 1].

During this period, the Galician Extraordinary Commission (GEC) played an important role. It was established under and subordinated to the leadership of the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (GSSR). On August 26, 1920, it changed its name from the Extraordinary Commission under the Ternopil Revkom to the Galician Extraordinary Commission, which was accompanied by an expansion of its powers.

Beginning on September 2 1920, the term «All-Galician Extraordinary Commission» (AGEC) began to be used, gradually replacing the previous abbreviation «GEC». However, throughout September, both names continued to appear in parallel on official stamps [28, p. 118].

The advance of Polish-Ukrainian forces in late September 1920 prevented the AGEK from fully implementing its activities. However, under the conditions of «revolutionary necessity» and in the absence of a clear legal framework, ChK operatives often resorted to extrajudicial methods in combating opponents of Bolshevism. During arrests, summary executions were practiced, and during searches, belongings were confiscated from the population without being recorded in official search protocols [28, p. 119]. Thus, the population of northeastern Galicia, centered in Ternopil, had the opportunity to experience firsthand the kind of “freedom” the Bolsheviks brought under the slogan of liberating workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords [29, p. 76].

The Information Department (initially headed by Ivan Shevchenko, and later by Kazimir Godlevsky) played an important role in operations. Its main tasks included gathering information through a network of secret agents who were tasked with monitoring public sentiment among the population and employees of Soviet institutions. Key areas of focus included uncovering hidden goods and surveilling former military personnel of the ZUNR and UNR, as well as their families. The department also oversaw David Frisch, head of external surveillance, who was responsible for the security of Soviet institutions, including the «Extraordinary Commission» (Cheka). Later, this department became the foundation for the Chekist intelligence network in Galicia, which was established following the creation of the Foreign Department of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) in December 1920 [28, p. 120].

During the counteroffensive by Polish-Ukrainian forces between September 15–20, 1920, the front line approached Ternopil. As a result, on September 18, 1920, an emergency evacuation of the Galrevkom units and the CPSG from the city was carried out. The next day, the Galrevkom left Ternopil and relocated beyond the Zbruch River. On September 25, in Vinnytsia, the Galrevkom was officially dissolved, and its remaining assets – nearly 7 million rubles, foreign currency, and requisitioned gold items – were transferred to the local bank [11, p. 115].

This was preceded by the de facto flight of the leadership of local revolutionary committees, who fled with documents and requisitioned property. For example, on September 16, along with the Zalishchyky revkom that had arrived in Borshchiv, wagons loaded with property set out toward Husyatyn. However, after an attack by «Petliurites from Tyutyunnyk’s cavalry unit», only 2 out of 50 carts managed to escape [32, p. 1].

Together with the Galrevkom, thousands of Galicians retreated, fearing repression by the Polish authorities. The highest numbers were recorded from the following counties (starostwa) of Eastern Galicia: Husyatyn – 163, Pidhaitsi – 134, Rohatyn – 122, Zalishchyky – 109, Zbarazh – 102 [33, p. 1].

In a letter from the Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding communist agitation, dated August 31, 1920, to the Chief Commander of the State Police, it was emphasized that, for the government, both in its domestic and foreign policy, materials that would help to anticipate the actions and intentions of the Bolsheviks in Polish territories (including Eastern Galicia, despite the uncertainty of its legal status – ed. A. Shehlov) following the Bolshevik occupation were of great importance [34, p. 2].

It was only in 1989 that a letter from V. Zatonsky dated September 23, 1920, was made public, in which he summarized the activities of the Galrevkom. In it, addressing Lenin, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, he wrote: «The Galician performance is over», «But regardless of the outcome – sooner or later, Galicia will have to be Sovietized» [11, p. 116].

In contrast to the expansionist plans of the leadership of Soviet Russia and its actual satellites in the Ukrainian SSR, according to L. Tsubov, the campaign of the allied armies of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Polish Republic in 1920 led to the destabilization of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine [35, p. 63], however, it did not eliminate it as an external threat, behind which stood the military might of Soviet Russia.

Soviet diversionary raids began in the fall of 1920, after the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission – State Political Directorate (VChK-DPU) made the first attempt to ignite a wide partisan war in the Soviet-Polish borderlands in the early 1920s with the help of operational-Cheka groups to provoke a revolutionary explosion among the «working masses». To prepare espionage-diversionary personnel, the DPU of the Ukrainian SSR created schools in Olevsk, Zhytomyr, Kozyatyn, Korosten, and Slavuta (Kotzan, Soviet-Polish Border) [8, p. 160].

On November 25, 1920, after the cessation of hostilities with the Polish, Ukrainian, and General Permikin's forces, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPSU) created the Galburo once again, planning a new attempt to ignite the communist revolution in Europe. The same key figures were included in its composition: V. Zatonsky, M. Baran, M. Levitsky, A. Baral (Savka), and I. Nemolovsky [36, p. 219].

During the Soviet-Polish peace negotiations, which began in mid-August 1920 in Baranovichi and continued in Minsk, the Soviet delegation actively sought to defend the interests of the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (GSSR). During this period, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and V. Lenin deemed it appropriate to ensure representation of the Galician SSR at these negotiations. As a result, on September 6, 1920, the Galrevkom appointed M. Baran, deputy of V. Zatonsky, as the official representative of the Galician SSR at the peace conference. M. Baran traveled to Riga, where the second phase of peace talks began on September 21. This led to the signing of an armistice between the warring parties on October 12, 1920, marking the temporary end of hostilities on this front [26, p. 333]. It was not only the terms of peace that were defined, but also the practical aspects of establishing a demarcation line and creating a «neutral zone». At the same time, it was emphasized that the troops of both sides would temporarily occupy the territories they held at the time of the cessation of hostilities, that is, as of October 18, 1920 [37, p. 53]. Poland recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), while the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) acknowledged the annexation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia by Poland. We agree with the interpretation of Polish authors that for Ukrainians, the Treaty of Riga was as significant as the Brest-Litovsk Peace of 1918 was for the Poles, when the regions of Chelm and part of Podlasie were supposed to be transferred to the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) [13, p. 15].

In summary, thanks to the courage and heroism of the Polish and Ukrainian military, not only was the annexation of Poland by Soviet Russia prevented, but also the Bolshevik plans for the «worldwide socialist revolution» were thwarted. However, this was made possible at the expense of concessions to the interests of the Ukrainian people [38, p. 63].

As O. Malets rightly points out, after Russia's defeat in its confrontation with Poland, the Bolsheviks came to terms with the fact that the historical compromise would take longer, and they pushed military-political revenge ideas to the background. However, it should be noted that they did not abandon these ideas entirely. At the same time, in the West, they were forced to acknowledge that Soviet Russia had become not only a source of communist threat but also a geopolitical reality that could no longer be ignored when attempts were made to restore a new balance of power in post-war Europe [15, p. 112].

However, the weak influence of communist ideology in Eastern Galicia and the failures on the front lines prevented the completion of the process of Sovietization in this region. This forced the Bolsheviks to postpone the implementation of their plans for the future. As Z. Zakhazhay notes, the decision of the Entente in March 1923 to place Eastern Galicia under Polish administration was viewed by the Bolsheviks as a temporary phenomenon, and the issue of its final territorial affiliation was considered just a matter of time [22, p. 14].

This is confirmed by archival sources that contain information about the sentiments on the Soviet side of the border. For example, in a report from the police department in the village of Vykhyvalyntsi, Skalat district, it was mentioned that on September 2, 1923, a propaganda rally was held on the opposite Soviet side of the Zbruch River with slogans such as «Long live the socialist communist international», «Our task is to reduce the world's scum», «Our Red Army will come to the aid of the oppressed laborers», and «Long live our free communist Russia» [39, p. 1].

The retreat of the Red Army behind the Zbruch River did not stop Moscow's attempts to Bolshevikize the western Ukrainian lands. The KPUG remained the main propaganda tool of the Kremlin, to which soldiers of the Ukrainian Soviet Army (ChUGA), refugees, and prisoners from the Dnieper region, the Don, Volga region, and Turkestan joined. These people, with the support of the Soviet republics of Ukraine and Russia, sought to overcome Polish rule [12, p. 308]. The dominant policy became the implementation of measures aimed at disrupting the military and political systems of the opposing side, especially from Soviet Ukraine against Poland along the «Zbruch border» in Eastern Galicia. As specifically emphasized by S. Humennyi, the new Polish-Soviet border defined by the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921 was demarcated without taking into account the ethnographic structure of the region and its economic and administrative situation. However, it corresponded to the historical tradition of the «Zbruch border» and the concept of the revival of the Commonwealth of Both Nations [6, p. 144].

According to M. Lytvyn, the defeat of the Kyiv campaign and the exhaustion of society after several years of war forced Warsaw to abandon the plan of creating an independent Ukrainian state, effectively (and legally, from 1923) incorporating Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia into Poland [13, p. 15], which was actively used by Soviet intelligence services to destabilize the internal political situation and increase pro-Soviet sentiments.

In the early 1920s, according to R. Kotsan's generalizations, the following types of activities were observed on the Soviet-Polish border: 1) sabotage and subversive, as well as provocative; 2) counter-sabotage and counter-provocative; 3) intelligence gathering; 4) counter-intelligence; 5) operational; 6) control and checkpoint; 7) informational and analytical [10, p. 446].

S. Humennyi correctly points out that during the demarcation of the state border line on the Ukrainian-Polish border, there were so-called «windows» – areas that were either not under the control of the authorities or were deliberately created by them as free zones. Through these areas, there was mass penetration into the territory of the neighboring state, not only for intelligence and sabotage activities but also to satisfy economic needs and other objectives [5, p. 111]. As an example, the researcher describes the story of one of the graduates of a Soviet espionage school that operated in Kharkiv in the early 1920s, and which received widespread coverage in the press of Western Ukraine at the time [7, p. 75].

Employees of the Foreign Department of the OGPU of the USSR and military intelligence actively supported the activities of the combat units of communist organizations in Galicia. Its territory was conditionally divided into four «military districts»: Lviv (Zolochiv, Rava-Ruska, Rohatyn districts), Ternopil (Ternopil, Chortkiv), Stanislav (Stanislav, Kolomyia), and Peremyshl (Peremyshl, Drohobych) [16, p. 20–21].

Alongside the state special services, the newly established states on the ruins of the three empires of Eastern and Central Europe began to face serious problems starting from 1920 due to the intelligence of the Bolshevik party – the so-called Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine («Zakordot»), which is mentioned in protocol No. 4 of the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine on May 21, 1920 [40].

The researcher O. Skrypnyk reveals that this organization created intelligence networks, relying on local party cells, and was engaged in political, economic, and military intelligence in southern Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, and other territories bordering Soviet Ukraine [41, p. 87–88]. The main goal of its activities, according to historian O. Kupchyk, was to organize illegal actions outside of Bolshevik control. He aimed to arrange local armed uprisings among the local population in Volhynia and Galicia, which were supposed to lead to the overthrow of the existing regime and the establishment of Soviet power in Poland, as well as the inclusion of the Western Ukrainian lands into the USSR [42, p. 67]. For these purposes, significant sums in dollars, Polish marks, and diamonds were used. The curators of the «Zakordot» of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine were F. Kon and V. Zatonsky, who were instructed by a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the head of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, G. Zinoviev [13, p. 16]. In particular, the advisor to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw, M. Lebedynets, mentioned in one of his letters that the Galician communists were provided with monthly financial support amounting to 1500 dollars [18, p. 60]. Drawing relevant parallels with the present day, researcher T. Halytska-Didukh emphasizes that the Russian government continues the policy of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes aimed at destabilizing Ukraine's internal political situation through the creation of an agent network, bribery of political figures, and so on [4, p. 80].

Thanks to the close cooperation between the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and Ukrainian communist sections abroad, a foreign committee was established in February 1921 with the aim of providing comprehensive support to the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia. At the initiative of this committee, on December 30, 1921, a meeting of representatives from foreign communist organizations of the CPSG was held in Prague, where a decision was made to create the Foreign Bureau to assist the party [4, p. 75].

On January 12, 1921, the district police commanders were informed that instructions had been sent from Vienna to Eastern Galicia and Bukovina to prepare the population for a revolution [43, p. 2].

The presence of Soviet agents on Polish territory was partly a result of the repatriation campaign carried out under the terms of the Riga Peace Treaty. Additionally, agents arrived from Vienna to organize revolutionary movements in Poland. The Bolsheviks recruited local residents who provided valuable intelligence and reported on key events. For this, they were paid monetary rewards, and recruitment was handled by special services. Among these agents were also local civil servants [4, p. 78–79].

In Eastern Galicia, representatives of the MOPR (International Organization for Aid to Revolution Fighters), founded in 1922 by the decision of the 4th Congress of the Comintern, were actively operating. This organization provided financial and material support to condemned communists. At the same time, Polish security forces were equally active in countering its activities, trying to neutralize the influence of communist agents in the region [4, p. 78].

At the same time, in early 1921, the Polish authorities faced a situation where, as in the Ternopil district, «confidants (secret agents – note by A. Shcheglov) of the state police were not working properly and were yielding no results» [44, p. 1].

During the first half of the 1920s, the Soviet side was able to maintain a destabilizing situation on the Polish-Soviet border. For instance, S. Humnyny cites an example where, for propaganda purposes among the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the image of the «burning Kresy», which sought reunification with Soviet Ukraine, as well as for conducting anti-Polish struggles in Galicia, a partisan unit called «Red Twelve» was sent to the territory of Ternopil region, near the village of Kudrynets, in the Borshchiv district. This formation, made up primarily of veterans from the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (Ukrainian Sich Riflemen – USS) and the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA), was commanded by Pavlo Sheremeta, Stepan Melnychuk, and Ivan Tsepka. It operated mainly in the border districts of the Borshchiv and Zalishchyky districts of the Tarnopol Voivodeship. The image of the unit's participants was heroized in the Soviet Ukrainian Socialist Republic, and Ukrainian writer Mykola Irchan (Andriy Bab'uk) dedicated a play titled “Twelve” to them [7, p. 96–97].

Historian M. Vakhula analyzes the controversial issue of the military raid organized under the leadership of Stepan Melnychuk and Petro Sheremeta in the autumn of 1922 in the Ternopil region by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). According to his assessment, Melnychuk and Sheremeta had no contacts with the underground organization of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) or any anti-communist partisan movement. The historian thoroughly examines the formation of myths surrounding the affiliation of Melnychuk's partisan unit, highlighting both nationalist and Soviet narratives that ideologized this raid. He notes that, perhaps, in order to emphasize the loyalty of the Galician people to communist ideals, particularly the residents of Ternopil, where units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the OUN underground operated until the mid-1950s, the Soviet authorities should have conducted certain activities, such as honoring the participants of the so-called “Red Twelve”. However, as the author points out, this did not happen, and it is likely related to the fact that the communist leadership or even the participants of those events remained in the shadows, and the events themselves did not align with the image of the «heroic vanguard of communism». At the same time, it is emphasized that while the «Red Twelve» was not a nationalist formation, its history also did not become a symbol of communist heroism [45, p. 189–200].

According to the calculations of lawyer O. Kozoriz, in 1922, 16 acts of sabotage were registered in the Drohobych district, 12 in the Krosno district, 10 in the Mostyska district, 9 in the Lancut district, 8 in the Przeworsk district, 19 in the Rava-Ruska district, 7 in the Lviv district, and 5 in the Przemyśl district [23, p. 135]. It is clear that not all of these acts had a direct “soviet” trace, but given the scale of the sabotage and subversive activities carried out by the USSR against Poland, one cannot rule out the possibility of inspiration for such actions at a considerable distance from the Soviet-Polish border, which could be explored in a separate study.

The inability of the Polish State Police to maintain order in the border regions, as emphasized by L. Yurchuk, led to the necessity of creating a special military formation for the protection of the Polish-Soviet border. In 1924, this formation became the Border Protection Corps [22, p. 11].

The memorial of the prominent Soviet politician O. Shumskyi, titled “Theses of Our Policy Regarding the Ukrainian Territories Occupied by Poland and Romania” from May 17, 1923, attests to the USSR's support for the anti-Polish diversionary movement in the region. Among other things, it emphasized the use of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia to weaken the Polish state [17, p. 219].

After the crisis of the early 1920s, which was characteristic of all political parties in Western Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPSU) and the Communist Revolutionary Party of Poland (KRP) initiated an intensified “Bolshevization”. In April 1924, under this banner, the party held its

5th conference, and in October 1925, at the 2nd congress, the party was renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU). Party members, including its local leadership, became hostages of the aggressive plans of Kremlin politicians regarding the “export of revolution” [21, p. 52]. Thus, the next stage of implementing Soviet expansionist plans concerning Poland as a whole and Ukrainian ethnic lands in particular requires separate research.

Conclusions. Thus, based on the critical analysis of modern domestic historiography and the introduction of previously unpublished archival documents into scientific circulation, the following conclusions of the study can be formulated:

While acknowledging the significant contributions of modern Ukrainian researchers on the period of the Ukrainian national-liberation struggle in the western Ukrainian lands and the establishment of Polish control over Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia after the restoration of the Polish state, it is important to note the lack of a comprehensive assessment of the destructive influence of the special services and party structures of Soviet Russia and its de facto satellite, the Ukrainian SSR, on the eastern Galician territories as a significant platform for the implementation of the Soviet leadership’s expansionist foreign policy after the conclusion of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919, during the “Liberation campaign against Poland” in 1920.

Undoubtedly, local communist organizations, which later merged into the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia, and in 1925 was renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, played an important role in realizing the Soviet expansionist foreign policy course.

However, the main tool of not only aggressive communist propaganda but also active intelligence and frequent diversions were the relevant Soviet special services and their agents.

Significant funds were invested in various activities, and a portion of the local population was engaged in active cooperation under the guidance of Soviet curators, but even their combined efforts did not achieve the strategic goals of the Kremlin leadership.

At the same time, it should not be overlooked that under their influence, there was significant disorganization of the region’s socio-political life, where the Second Polish Republic sought to assert its power through certain repressive and punitive measures. However, this does not in any way imply that the Soviet intelligence, subversive, and propaganda activities in Eastern Galicia from 1919 to 1923 were in the interests of the majority of the Ukrainian population in the new territories of the Lviv, Stanisławów, and Ternopil voivodeships of the Polish state.

Bibliography

1. Історичні основи зовнішньополітичного курсу пострадянських країн: монографія / за ред. А. Бульвінського. Київ : ДУ «Інститут всесвітньої історії НАН України», 2023. 464 с.
2. Гольцов А. Експансіоністська геостратегія держав: теоретичні аспекти. *Наукові праці Міжрегіональної Академії управління персоналом. Політичні науки та публічне управління*. 2024. № 1 (73). С. 62–67.
3. Головченко В. Витоки агресивності зовнішньої політики Росії. *Київські історичні студії*. 2016. № 2. С. 68–75.
4. Галицька-Дідух Т. Радянська пропагандистсько-агітаційна діяльність у Східній Галичині в 1920-х рр. *Науковий і культурно-просвітний краєзнавчий часопис «Галичина»*. 2023. № 36. С. 70–83.
5. Гуменний С. Основні категорії нелегальних мігрантів на українському відрізку радянсько-польського кордону в 20–30 х рр. ХХ століття. *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2017. Вип. 47. С. 107–113.
6. Гуменний С. «Збручанський кордон» (1772–1939): міграція, контрабанда та шпигунство. *Польсько-українське пограниччя: етнополітичні, мовні та релігійні критерії самоідентифікації населення* / за ред. І. Патера. Львів, 2019. С. 137–150.
7. Гуменний С. Нелегальні міграційні процеси на польсько-радянському кордоні (в адміністративних межах УСРР/УРСР) у 1921–1939 рр. : дис... докт. філос.: 032. Київ, 2021. 249 с.

8. Коцан Р. Радянсько-польський кордон у 1921–1939 роках: формування та функціонування: монографія. Луцьк : Вежа-Друк, 2018. 380 с.
9. Коцан, Р. Порушення режиму радянсько-польського кордону та боротьба з ним у міжвоєнний період (1921–1939 роки). *Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу*, № 39. 2019. С. 68–78. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.68-78>
10. Коцан Р. І. Радянсько-польський кордон у 1921–1939 роках: формування та функціонування. Вид. 2. Луцьк: Вежа Друк, 2021. 553 с.
11. Литвин М. ЗУНР і Галицька СРР у геостратегії більшовицької Росії. *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність*. 2009. Вип. 18. С. 101–118.
12. Литвин М. Від Галревкому до Закордоту. Воєнна та гібридно-політична експансія Росії у Східну Галичину після Першої світової війни. *Росія–Україна: зради, союзи, війни* / ред. М. Литвин. Львів : «Астон», 2022. С. 293–310.
13. Литвин М. Воєнно-політична експансія більшовицької Росії на західні землі України в 1919–1923 рр. *Український історичний журнал*. 2022. Ч. 5. С. 4–17.
14. Малець О. Українсько-польські відносини в діяльності Комінтерну в 20-х рр. ХХ ст. *Україна–Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість*. 2017. Вип. 10. С. 33–40.
15. Малець О. Комінтерн у зовнішній політиці радянської Росії у першій половині 1920-х рр. *Гілея: науковий вісник*. 2018. Вип. 128 (1). С. 110–113.
16. Подкур Р. Діяльність спецслужб СРСР у прикордонні радянської України у 1920–1930-х рр. *З архівів ВУЧК–ГПУ–НКВД–КГБ*. 2014. № 2. С. 7–33.
17. Разиграєв О. Волинське воєводство в контексті польсько-радянських взаємин: глобальні та регіональні виміри безпеки (1921–1925 рр.). Історичні паралелі з сучасною ситуацією на Сході України. *Український історичний збірник*. 2017. Вип. 19. С. 211–229.
18. Соляр І. Радянофільство у Західній Україні (1920-ті рр.). *Український історичний журнал*. 2009. № 1. С. 55–67.
19. Виздрік В. С. Встановлення польської адміністрації в Галичині на початку 20-х років ХХ століття. *Науково-теоретичний альманах «Грані»*. 2014. № 8. С. 157–163.
20. Пиріг М. Український ліворадикальний рух у Польщі (1919–1929 рр.) : дис... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Львів: Львів. нац. унів. ім. І. Франка, 2016. 245 с.
21. Гусак, Р. Ліворадикальний рух Східної Галичини та Західної Волині міжвоєнного періоду. *Наукові записки Тернопільського національного педагогічного університету імені Володимира Гнатюка. Серія : історія*. 2014. Вип. 2, Ч. 3. С. 51–56.
22. Захожай З. Політика радянського партійно-державного керівництва щодо Східної Галичини в міжвоєнний період (1921–1939 рр.) : автореф. дис... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Переяслав-Хмельницький, 2010. 19 с.
23. Козоріз О. Організація та діяльність поліції на західноукраїнських землях у складі Республіки Польща (1921–1939) : дис... канд. юрид. наук: 12.00.01. Львів, 2018. 254 с.
24. Російська імперська державність: сучасні міжнародні виміри : аналітичний альманах. Ч. I / за ред. А. Кудряченка. Київ : Державна установа «Інститут всесвітньої історії НАН України», 2023. 332 с.
25. Веденєєв Д., Гавриленко О., Закутайло О., Морозов П., Рожен Л., Цибулькін В., Нариси з історії розвідки суб'єктів державотворення на теренах України. Київ : Преса України, 2011. 536 с.
26. Лісна І. Становлення державності в Україні (1917–1922 рр.) : монографія у 3-х ч. Ч. 2. Миколаїв : Видавництво ЧДУ імені Петра Могили, 2014. 444 с.
27. Декрети, постанови, інструкції, обіжники, листівки Галицького Ревкому. 1 серпня-2 вересня 1920 р. *ДАТО* (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. Р-2367. Оп. 1. Спр 24. 22 арк.
28. Кузьмин Р. Політичні та соціально-економічні перетворення більшовиків на Волині та у Східній Галичині в ході радянсько-польської війни 1919–1920 років : дис... канд. іст. н. : 07.00.01. Київ, 2013. 303 с.
29. Лісна І. Становлення державності в Галичині (1918–1923 рр.) : монографія. Тернопіль, 2001. 92 с.
30. Резолюція мітингу мешканців м. Заліщики, який відбувся 8 серпня 1920 р. *ДАТО* (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. Р-2287. Оп. 1. Спр. 4, 1 арк.

31. Сокирська В. Відносини між РСФРР і УСРР (1919–1929 рр.): політико-економічний та адміністративно-територіальний дискурс : автореф. дис... доктр. іст. наук : 07.00.02. Тернопіль, 2018. 44 с.
32. Звіт Борщівського повітового ревкому про діяльність з 1-го вересня по 15 вересня 1920 р. 22 вересня 1920 р. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. Р-2290. Оп. 1. Спр. 1, 2 арк.
33. Списки осіб, які добровільно пішли з радянськими військами. 1921 р. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. 274. Оп. 4. Спр 5, 136 арк.
34. Інформація Міністерства внутрішніх справ про комуністичну агітацію в Польщі, донесення повітових команд держполіції цих питань. 24 вересня 1920 р. – 19 лютого 1921 р. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. 274. Оп 1. Спр 2. 29 арк.
35. Цубов Л. Українсько-польський союз у війні проти Радянської Росії 1920 року. *Вісник Національного університету «Львівська політехніка»*. 2004. № 502. Держава та армія. С. 59–64.
36. Кузьмин Р. Політичні та соціально-економічні перетворення більшовиків на Волині та у Східній Галичині в ході радянсько-польської війни 1919–1920 років. : дис... канд. іст. наук: 07.00.01. Київ, 2013. 303 с.
37. Каленська А. Прикордонні війська ОДПУ–НКВС СРСР на Поділлі та Південно-Східній Волині у 1921–1939 рр. : дис. ... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Київ, 2012. 238 с.
38. Телегуз А. Російсько-польська війна 1920–1921 років: національне питання у міждержавних відносинах. *Національна політика радянського комуністичного режиму щодо українського та польського народів (1920 – першій половині 1940 рр.) : монографія / ред. В. Лушай, А. Телегуз та ін. Київ : Вид-во НПУ імені М. П. Драгоманова, 2020. С. 55–63.*
39. Звіт постерунку в с. Вихвалинці Скалатського повіту про хід мітингу з радянської сторони. 20 вересня 1923 р. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. 274. Оп. 4. Спр. 11, 1 арк.
40. Козенюк В. «ЗАКОРДОТ» у системі спецслужб радянської України. *Воєнна історія*. 2002. № 1. URL: https://warhistory.ukrlife.org/1_02_9.htm (дата звернення: 10.04.2025).
41. Скрипник О. Українська розвідка. 100 років боротьби, протистоянь, звершень. Вид. 2. Київ : «АДЕФ–Україна», 2020. 344 с.
42. Купчик О. Таємна діяльність закордонного відділу ЦК КП(б)У на території Волині (початок 1920-х років). *Українська полоністика: історико-філософські дослідження*. 2004. Вип. 1. С. 66–72.
43. Розпорядження Львівського намісництва і окружної команди держполіції про боротьбу із комуністичною агітацією у прикордонних зонах. 12 січня 1921 – 12 лютого 1921 рр. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. 274. Оп. 1. Спр. 127, 4 арк.
44. Копія інформації Президії намісництва про поганий стан розвідувальної служби на території Малопольщі. 22 лютого – 25 лютого 1921 р. ДАТО (Держ. архів Львів. обл.). Ф. 274. Оп. 4. Спр. 1. 2 арк.
45. Вахула М. Партизанський рейд під керівництвом С. Мельничука і П. Шеремети 1922 р. та версії цієї події в історіографії. *Наукові зошити історичного факультету Львівського університету*. 2011. Вип. 12. С. 189–200.

References

1. A. Bulvinskyi (eds.) (2023) *Istorychni osnovy zovnishnopolitychnoho kursu postradianskykh krain [Historical Foundations of the Foreign Policy Orientation of Post-Soviet States]*, Kyiv: DU «Instytut vsesvitnoi istorii NAN Ukrainy» [In Ukrainian].
2. Holtsov, A. (2024) Ekspansionistska heostrategiia derzhav: teoretychni aspekty, in [Expansionist geostrategy of states: theoretical aspects]: *Naukovi pratsi Mizhrehionalnoi Akademii upravlinnia personalom. Politychni nauky ta publichne upravlinnia – Scientific Works of the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management. Political Science and Public Administration*, 1(15), 62–67 [In Ukrainian].
3. Holovchenko, V. (2016) Vytoky ahresyvnosti zovnishnoi polityky Rosii [Origins of aggressiveness in Russia's foreign policy], *Kyivski istorychni studii – Kyiv Historical Studies*, 2, 68–75 [In Ukrainian].
4. Halytska-Didukh, T. (2023) Radianska propahandystsko-ahitatsiina diialnist u Skhidnii Halychyni v 1920-kh rr. [Soviet propaganda and agitation activities in Eastern Halychyna in the 1920s.], *Naukovyi i kulturno-prosvitnii kraieznavchyi chasopys «Halychyna» – Scientific and Cultural-Educational Local History Journal «Halychyna»*, 36, 70–83 [In Ukrainian].

5. Humennyi, S. (2017) Osnovni katehorii nelehalnykh mihrantiv na ukrainskomu vidrizku radiansko-polskoho kordonu v 20–30-kh rr. XX stolittia [Main categories of illegal migrants on the Ukrainian section of the Soviet-Polish border in the 1920s–1930s]. *Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakultetu Zaporizkoho natsionalnoho universytetu – Scholarly Works of the Faculty of History of Zaporizhzhia National University*, 47, 109–114 [In Ukrainian].
6. Humennyi, S. (2019) «Zbruchanskyi kordon» (1772–1939): mihratsiia, kontrabanda ta shpyhunstvo [«The Zbruch border» (1772–1939): migration, smuggling, and espionage], *Polsko-ukrainske pohranychchia: etnopolitychni, movni ta relihiini kryterii samoidentyfikatsii naseleattia – The Polish-Ukrainian Borderland: Ethnopolitical, Linguistic, and Religious Criteria of Population Self-Identification*, (pp. 137–150), Lviv [In Ukrainian].
7. Humennyi, S. (2021) Nelehalni mihratsiini protsesy na polsko-radianskomu kordoni (v administratyvnykh mezhakh USRR/URSР) u 1921–1939 rr. [Illegal migration processes on the Polish-Soviet border (within the administrative boundaries of the USSR/URSР) in 1921–1939]. *PhD's thesis*. Kyiv [In Ukrainian].
8. Kotsan, R. (2018) *Radiansko-polskyi kordon u 1921–1939 rokakh: formuvannia ta funktsionuvannia [The Soviet-Polish Border in 1921–1939: Formation and Functioning]*, Lutsk: Vezha-Druk [In Ukrainian].
9. Kotsan, R. (2019) Porushennia rezhymu radiansko-polskoho kordonu ta borotba z nym u mizhvoiennyi period (1921–1939 roky) [Violations of the Soviet-Polish Border Regime and the Fight Against Them in the Interwar Period (1921–1939)], *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu – Historical and Political Issues of the Contemporary World*, 39, 68–78. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.68-78> [In Ukrainian].
10. Kotsan, R. (2021) *Radiansko-polskyi kordon u 1921–1939 rokakh: formuvannia ta funktsionuvannia, Vyd. 2 [The Soviet-Polish Border in 1921–1939: Formation and Functioning. 2nd ed.]*, Lutsk: Vezha-Druk. 448 p. [In Ukrainian].
11. Lytvyn, M. (2009) ZUNR i Halytska SRR u heostratehii bilshovytskoi Rosii [ZUNR and the Galician SSR in the Geostrategy of Bolshevik Russia], *Ukraina: kulturna spadshchyna, natsionalna svidomist, derzhavnist - Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Consciousness, Statehood*, 18, 101–118 [In Ukrainian].
12. Lytvyn, M. (2022) Vid Halrevkomu do Zakordotu. Voienna ta hibrydno-politychna ekspansiiia Rosii u Skhidnu Halychynu pislia Pershoi svitovoi viiny [From Halrevkom to Zakordot. Military and Hybrid-Political Expansion of Russia into Eastern Galicia After World War II], *Rosiiia–Ukraina: zrady, soiuzy, viiny – Russia–Ukraine: Betrayals, Alliances, Wars*, (pp. 293–310). Lviv: «Aston» [In Ukrainian].
13. Lytvyn, M. (2022) Voienno-politychna ekspansiiia bilshovytskoi Rosii na zakhidni zemli Ukrainy v 1919–1923 rr. [Military-political expansion of Bolshevik Russia into the Western Lands of Ukraine in 1919–1923], *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal – Ukrainian Historical Journal*, 5, 4–17 [In Ukrainian].
14. Malets, O. (2017) Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny v diialnosti Kominternu v 20-kh rr. XX st. [Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Activities of the Comintern in the 1920s], *Ukraina–Polshcha: istorychna spadshchyna i suspilna svidomist - Ukraine–Poland: Historical Heritage and Social Consciousness*, 10, 33–40. [In Ukrainian].
15. Malets, O. (2018) Komintern u zovnishnii politytsi radianskoi Rosii u pershii polovyni 1920-kh rr. [Comintern in the foreign policy of Soviet Russia in the first half of the 1920s], *Hileya: scientific bulletin – Hileya: Scientific Bulletin*, 128 (1), 110–113 [In Ukrainian].
16. Podkur, R. (2014) Diialnist spetssluzhb SRSР u prykordonni radianskoi Ukrainy u 1920–1930-kh [The Activities of the USSR Special Services in the Borderlands of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s–1930s], *Z arkhiviv VUChK–HPU–NKVD–KHB – From the Archives of the VUChK–GPU–NKVD–KGB*, 2, 7–33 [In Ukrainian].
17. Razyhraiev, O. (2017) Volynske voievodstvo v konteksti polsko-radianskykh vzaiemyn: hlobalni ta rehionalni vymiry bezpeky (1921–1925 rr.). Istorychni paraleli z suchasnoiu sytuatsiieiu na Skhodi Ukrainy [The Volhynian Voivodeship in the Context of Polish-Soviet Relations: Global and Regional Dimensions of Security (1921–1925)], *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zbirnyk – Ukrainian Historical Collection*, 19, 211–229 [In Ukrainian].
18. Soliar, I. (2009) Radianofilstvo u Zakhidnii Ukraini (1920-ti rr.) [Sovietophilia in Western Ukraine (1920s)], *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal – Ukrainian Historical Journal*, 1, 55–67 [In Ukrainian].
19. Vyzdryk, V. (2014) Vstanovlennia polskoi administratsii v Halychyni na pochatku 20-kh rokiv XX stolittia [The establishment of Polish administration in Halychyna at the beginning of the 1920s], *Naukovo-teoretychnyi almanakh «Hrani» – Scientific-Theoretical Almanac «Hrani»*, 8, 157–163 [In Ukrainian].

20. Pyrih, M. (2016) Ukrainyskyi livoradykalnyi rukh u Polshchi (1919–1929 rr.) [The Ukrainian Left-Radical Movement in Poland (1919–1929)]. *Candidate's Thesis*. Lviv: Ivan Franko National University of Lviv [In Ukrainian].
21. Husak, R. (2014) Livoradykalnyi rukh Skhidnoi Halychyny ta Zakhidnoi Volyni mizhvoiennoho periodu [The left-radical movement in Eastern Halychyna and Western Volyn in the interwar period], *Naukovi zapysky Ternopilskoho natsionalnogo pedahohichnogo universytetu imeni Volodymyra Hnatiuka. Serii: istoriia – Scientific Notes of Volodymyr Hnatiuk Ternopil National Pedagogical University. Series: History*, Iss. 2, Part 3, 51–56 [In Ukrainian].
22. Zakhozhai, Z. (2010) Polityka radianskoho partiino-derzhavnogo kerivnytstva shchodo Skhidnoi Halychyny v mizhvoiennyi period (1921–1939 rr.) [The policy of the Soviet party-state leadership towards Eastern Halychyna in the interwar period (1921–1939)]. *Extended abstract of candidate's thesis*. Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi [In Ukrainian].
23. Kozoriz, O. (2018) Orhanizatsiia ta diialnist politsii na zakhidnoukrainskykh zemliakh u skladi Respubliky Polshcha (1921–1939) [Organization and Activities of the Police in the Western Ukrainian Lands as Part of the Republic of Poland (1921–1939)]. *Candidate's thesis*. Lviv: Ivan Franko National University of Lviv [In Ukrainian].
24. *Rosiiska imperska derzhavnist: suchasni mizhnarodni vymiry: analitychnyi almanakh, Ch. I [Rosiiska imperska derzhavnist: suchasni mizhnarodni vymiry: analitychnyi almanakh. P.1]* (2023). Kyiv: Derzhavna ustanova «Instytut vsesvitnoi istorii NAN Ukrainy» [In Ukrainian].
25. Havrylenko, O. & Morozov, P. & Tsybulkin, V. & Rozhen, L. & Viedienieiev, D. & Zakutailo, O. (2011) *Narysy z istorii rozvidky subiektiv derzhavotvorennia na terenakh Ukrainy [Essays on the History of Intelligence of State-Building Entities in the Territory of Ukraine]*. Kyiv: Presa Ukrainy [In Ukrainian].
26. Lisna, I. (2014) *Stanovlennia derzhavnosti v Ukraini (1917–1922 rr.): monohrafiia u 3-kh ch. Ch. 2 [Formation of Statehood in Ukraine (1917–1922): monograph in 3 Parts. Part 2]*. Mykolaiv: Vydavnytstvo ChDU imeni Petra Mohyla [In Ukrainian].
27. Dekrety, postanovy, instruksii, obizhnyky, lystivky Halytskoho Revkomu. 1 serpnia-2 veresnia 1920 r. [Decrees, Resolutions, Instructions, Circulars, and Leaflets of the Halych Revkom. August 1 – September 2, 1920]. F. R-2367, Op. 1. Spr. 24, 22 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].
28. Kuzmyn, R. (2011) Stvorennia ta diialnist Halytskoi Nadzvychaino Komisii (HNK–VseHnk) u serpni – veresni 1920 roku [Establishment and Activities of the Galician Extraordinary Commission (GNK–VseGNK) in August – September 1920]. *Hileya: naukovyi visnyk – Hileya: scientific bulletin*, 54 (11), 117–124 [In Ukrainian].
29. Lisna, I. (2001) *Stanovlennia derzhavnosti v Halychyni (1918–1923 rr.) [Formation of Statehood in Galicia (1918–1923)]*. Ternopil [In Ukrainian].
30. Rezoliutsiia mitynhu meshkantsiv m. Zalishchyky, yakyi vidbuvsia 8 serpnia 1920 r. [Resolution of the Rally of the Residents of Zalishchyky Held on August 8, 1920]. F. R-2287. Op. 1. Spr. 4, 1 ark. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].
31. Sokyrka, V. (2018) Vidnosyny mizh RSFR i USSR (1919–1929 rr.): polityko-ekonomichni ta administratyvno-terytorialnyi dyskurs [Relations between the RSFSR and the USSR (1919–1929): political-economic and administrative-territorial discourse]. *Extended abstract of Doctor's thesis*. Ternopil [In Ukrainian].
32. Zvit Borshchivskoho povitovoho revkomu pro diialnist z 1-ho veresnia po 15 veresnia 1920 r. 22 veresnia 1920 r. [Report of the Borshchiv County Revolutionary Committee on Activities from September 1 to September 15, 1920. September 22, 1920]. F. R-2290, Op. 1, Spr. 1, 2 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].
33. Spysky osib, yaki dobrovilno pishly z radianskymy viiskamy. 1921 r. [Lists of Persons Who Voluntarily Accompanied the Soviet Troops. 1921]. F. 274, Op. 4, Spr. 5, 136 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].
34. Informatsiia Ministerstva vnutrishnikh sprav pro komunistychnu ahitatsiiu v Polshchi, donesennia povitovykh komand derzhpolitsii tsykh pytan. 24 veresnia 1920 r. – 19 liutoho 1921 r. [Information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on Communist Agitation in Poland, Reports from County Commands of the State

Police on These Issues. September 24, 1920 – February 19, 1921]. F. 274, Op. 1, Spr. 2, 29 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].

35. Tsubov, L. (2004) Ukrainsko-polskyi soiuz u viini proty Radianskoi Rosii 1920 roku [The Ukrainian-Polish Alliance in the War Against Soviet Russia in 1920]. *Visnyk Natsionalnoho universytetu «Lvivska politekhnik» – Bulletin of the National University «Lviv Polytechnic»*. 502: *Derzhava ta armiia*, 59–64 [In Ukrainian].

36. Kuzmyn, R. (2013) Politychni ta sotsialno-ekonomichni peretvorennia bilshovykiv na Volyni ta u Skhidnii Halychyni v khodi radiansko-polskoi viiny 1919–1920 rokiv [Political and Socio-Economic Transformations of the Bolsheviks in Volyn and Eastern Galicia During the Soviet-Polish War of 1919–1920]. *Candidate's thesis*. Kyiv [In Ukrainian].

37. Kalenska, A. (2012) Prykordonni viiska OGPU–NKVS SRSR na Podilli ta Pivdenno-Skhidnii Volyni u 1921–1939 rr. [The border troops of the OGPU–NKVD of the USSR in Podillia and South-Eastern Volyn in 1921–1939], *Candidate's thesis*. Kyiv [In Ukrainian].

38. Telehuz, A. (2020) Rosiisko-polska viina 1920–1921 rokiv: natsionalne pytannia u mizhderzhavnykh vidnosynakh [The Russian-Polish War of 1920–1921: The National Question in Interstate Relations], *Natsionalna polityka radianskoho komunistychnoho rezhymu shchodo ukrainskoho ta polskoho narodiv (1920 – pershii polovyni 1940 rr.) – The National Policy of the Soviet Communist Regime Toward the Ukrainian and Polish Peoples (1920 – First Half of the 1940s)*, (pp. 55–63). Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo NPU imeni M. P. Drahomanova [In Ukrainian].

39. Zvit posterunku v s. Vykhyalynsi Skalatskoho povitu pro khid mitynny z radianskoi storony. 20 veresnia 1923 r. [Report of the Police Station in the Village of Vykhyalynsi, Skalat County, on the Course of the Rally from the Soviet Side. September 20, 1923]. F. 274, Op. 4, Spr. 11, 1 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].

40. Kozeniuk, V. (2002) «ZAKORDOT» u systemi spetssluzhb radianskoi Ukrainy [«ZAKORDOT» in the system of special services of Soviet Ukraine], *Voienna istoriia – Military History*, 1, Retrieved from https://warhistory.ukrlife.org/1_02_9.htm [In Ukrainian].

41. Skrypnyk, O. (2020) *Ukrainska rozvidka. 100 rokiv borotby, protystoian, zvershen. Vyd. 2 [Ukrainian Intelligence. 100 Years of Struggle, Confrontations, Achievements. 2nd ed.]*. Kyiv: «ADEF–Ukraina» [In Ukrainian].

42. Kupchyk, O. (2004) Taiemna diialnist zakordonnoho viddilu TsK KP(b)U na terytorii Volyni (pochatok 1920-kh rokiv) [Secret Activities of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U in the Territory of Volyn (Early 1920s)], *Ukrainska polonistyka: istoryko-filosofski doslidzhennia – Ukrainian Polish Studies: Historical and Philosophical Research*, 1, 66–72 [In Ukrainian].

43. Rozporiadzhennia Lvivskoho namisnytstva i okruzhnoi komandy derzhpolitsii pro borotbu iz komunistychnoiu ahitatsiieiu u prykordonnykh zonakh. 12 sichnia 1921 – 12 liutoho 1921 rr. [Order of the Lviv Viceregency and the District State Police Command on Combating Communist Agitation in Border Areas. January 12 – February 12, 1921]. F. 274, Op. 1, Spr. 127, 4 p. *SALR (State Archive of Lviv Region)* [In Ukrainian].

44. Kopiia informatsii Prezydii namisnytstva pro pohanyi stan rozvidovalnoi sluzhby na terytorii Malopolshchi. 22 liutoho – 25 liutoho 1921 r. [Copy of the Information from the Presidium of the Viceregency on the Poor Condition of the Intelligence Service in the Territory of Lesser Poland. February 22 – February 25, 1921]. F. 274, Op. 4, Spr. 1, 2 p. [In Ukrainian].

45. Vakhula, M. (2011) Partyzanskyi reid pid kerivnytstvom S. Melnychuka i P. Sheremety 1922 r. ta versii tsiei podii v istoriohrafii [The partisan raid led by S. Melnychuk and P. Sheremeta in 1922 and versions of this event in historiography], *Naukovi zoshyty istorychnoho fakultetu Lvivskoho universytetu – Proceedings of the Faculty of History of Lviv University*, 12, 189–200 [In Ukrainian].